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I. INTRODUCTION
[Tihe peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with
the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences
of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just
causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of
all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. 1
On June 10, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
exercised judicial pragmatism and activism to elucidate nagging issues
surrounding the status of overseas dependencies under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2), the federal alienage diversity jurisdiction statute.2
Under this statute, "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between...
citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state".3 As will be
discussed below, the definition of "foreign state" had proven to be a
difficult issue for the various federal circuits to find conformity.4 With
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., the
Supreme Court, led by Justice David Souter, provided the federal courts
long-needed guidance and clarification. What was promulgated provides
a relatively simple rule in determining the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
over citizens of foreign dependencies under the alienage statute. The
genesis of this rule, however, has been painstaking, particularly in light of
decisions rendered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the evolution of the alienage
jurisdiction statute and the status of overseas dependent territories in
light of the recent Supreme Court decision. Part I of this Article will provide
a brief historical background of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and its purpose. Part
II will discuss the concepts of the state and statelessness, as well as the
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at para. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 122 S. Ct.
2054 (2002) [hereinafter Traffic Stream].
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2002).
4. Prior to Traffic Stream, one author points out that,
The federal circuits ... disagree whether corporations organized under the
laws of certain foreign entities can gain access to the federal courts under 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Specifically, the circuits disagree whether federal subject
matter jurisdiction exists in cases between a U.S. citizen and an alien
corporation registered under the laws of a foreign entity that lacks clear
recognition as a "foreign state".... The circuit split on this point presents an
interesting legal question and one of more than pedantic interest.
Walter C. Hutchens, Alienage Jurisdiction and the Problem of Stateless Corporations:
What is a Foreign State for Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q.
1067, 1069 (1998).
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role of dependent territories in international affairs. Part III will discuss and
analyze the various federal decisions seemingly at loggerheads with each
other on the issue of federal jurisdiction over dependent territories. Finally,
Part IV will review the Traffic Stream decision and how this ruling was
necessary to ensure judicial economy and pragmatism in an unprecedented
era of expansion in the areas of international trade and investment.
II. PART I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
OF THE ALIENAGE JURISDICTION STATUTE
Under the federal Constitution, "the judicial Power [of the United States]
shall extend to all Cases ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." 5 The Founding Fathers believed that
this power was "vital to ensure that U.S. courts would speak with a single,
unitary voice on matters affecting foreign parties. Federal courts were also
thought less likely than state courts to treat foreign nationals unfairly,
thereby prejudicing the Nation's foreign relations and foreign commerce."6
Thus, alienage jurisdiction established under Article 11 was conferred on
the federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789.7
It has been pointed out that during and after the Revolutionary War, "a
distinctly anti-British attitude pervaded U.S. society .... Economic factors,
which some claim were the root cause of the Revolution, fueled antagonism
toward the British in the post-war period" as British creditors found the state
court's unresponsive to their collections efforts.8 Those in favor of the
Constitution, the Federalists, feared that the new nation would not be able to
attract foreign capital "absent easier enforcement of commercial obligations
owed to foreign citizens by U.S. citizens. A national court system was
5. U.S. CONST. art. IIi, § 2.
6. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 25 (1996).
[T]he First Congress passed an alienage diversity statute for much the same
reason as those of the framers: foreign relations and the desire to encourage
flow of capital to the United States .... Today, alienage jurisdiction serves a
similar purpose by preventing potential discrimination against foreign litigants
in state courts. Federal courts are commonly perceived as being more neutral
than state courts. This proposition may be debatable however ....
Mark Baker, Lost in the Judicial Wilderness: The Stateless Corporation after Matimak
Trading, 19 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 130, 136 (1998).
7. Hutchens, supra note 4, at 1072.
8. Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and
Modem Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Non-citizens, 21
YALE INT'L L.J. 1, 6-7 (1996).
considered one solution." 9 Eventually, these considerations prevailed and
"a consensus emerged that favored alienage jurisdiction. When it came
time for ratification, even opposition to diversity did not necessarily mean
opposition to alienage jurisdiction. In the end, alienage jurisdiction was
included as part of Article Ill without major controversy."10
The alienage diversity statute codified under 28 U.S.C § 1332(a), is the
"modem incarnation" of the judicial powers bestowed by the First Congress
under the 1789 Act."
III. PART II: THE STATE AND STATELESSNESS
From the time of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides to the
collapse of the Soviet regime in the early 1990s, "realism ... tended to
dominate theoretical interpretations of world politics. '12 Central to the
9. Id. at 8. Madison focused specifically on the negative commercial impact of
the treatment of noncitizens in the state courts: "We well know, sir, that foreigners
cannot get justice done them in [the state] courts, and this has prevented many wealthy
gentlemen from trading or residing among us." Id. at 14.
"[C]ommerce was of vital importance to the new United States, not merely because of
the size of the merchant marine-second only to that of Great Britain-but because the
new government under the Constitution ... depended for its revenues on customs
receipts." ROBERT H. FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 51 (3d ed. 1975).
It was to Europe that the American leaders in 1776 had to turn for instruction
about the traditions and nature of diplomacy .... A reflection of the economic
motive can be seen in the close connection which, in American eyes, existed
between commerce and foreign policy .... Thus, the existence or non-
existence of commercial relations with other powers appeared as the
touchstone of participation in a state system as an independent power.
FELIX GILBERT, THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: TO THE FAREWELL
ADDRESS 15-16 (Princeton University Press 1961).
10. Johnson, supra note 8, at 20.
11. Id. It should be noted that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress
overextended the mandate of Article Ill, and conferred upon the federal courts jurisdiction
"over all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity... [in which] an alien is a
party." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § I1, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). Therefore, under the Act, a
foreigner could bring suit against another foreigner in U.S. district courts. Frank Eric
Marchetti, Comment, Alienage Jurisdiction over Stateless Corporations: Revealing the
Folly of Matimak Trading Company v. Khalily, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 261 (1999). By
1809, the Supreme Court intervened and found that Article III alienage jurisdiction was
limited to suits between American citizens and aliens, making the "alien is a party"
language of Section II invalid. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. 303 (1809); Mossman
v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 12 (1800) cited in BORN, supra note 6, at 25-26.
Some seventy years later, in 1875, the Congress amended the Judiciary Act to conform to
the Constitutional limitations directed by the Supreme Court and gave the federal courts
original jurisdiction over controversies between "citizens of a State and foreign states,
citizens, or subjects." 18 Stat. 470, cited in Marchetti, supra note 11, at 262-63. Further
changes occurred in 1887, 1911, 1948, 1958, 1976, 1988, and 1996. Id. at 262-264. But
the intent of the 1875 legislation continues under the current alienage jurisdiction statute.
12. Neil R. Richardson, International Trade as a Force for Peace, in CONTROVERSIES
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM AND THE NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE 282
(Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1995).
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pervasive realist approach to international relations is the concept of the
state. The state has been defined as,
The primary legal (juridical) person and subject in international law. A state, by
evidencing a separate legal and corporate personality, fulfills the basic
requirements for entrance into the community of nations. This suggests that the
entity is free from political control by another state and is free to contract and
enter into relations with other states. A state has several characteristics it shares
in common with other states as outlined, for example, in Article I of the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933): (1) territory;
(2) population; (3) government (the political agent for the state); and (4)
independence of action (sovereignty). States as international persons are
formed through the creation of a new state, the merger of existing states, or the
division of existing states .... To be a state, the entity must have the capacity to
enter into international relations and act according to international law.1 3
Interestingly, under both the Constitution and the alienage jurisdiction
statute, the term "foreign state" is "conspicuously left undefined."'
14
This is probably so because at the creation of the Constitution and the
Judiciary Act, the Framers and members of Congress do not appear to
have been cognizant of the concept of statelessness. 15 In fact, prior to
World War I, "the concept of statelessness had never been discussed by
American courts .... Congress granted the federal district courts
13. ROBERT L. BLEDSOE & BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
DICTIONARY 56-57 (1987). See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1936). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987). ("Under international law, a state is an entity
that has a defined territory and a permanent population under the control of its own
government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities." Id.); Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo
Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 409-14 (1999); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1936) (listing internationally
recognized characteristics of statehood: "the power to declare and wage war; to conclude
peace; to maintain diplomatic ties with other sovereigns; to acquire territory by discovery
and occupation; and to make international agreements and treaties").
14. Baker, supra note 6, at 137. Although the definition of "foreign state" remains
elusive, some guidance has been provided by the courts and commentators. "[I]t has
been held that a foreign state is one formally recognized by the executive branch of the
United States government." CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3604 (2nd ed. 1984).
Because the Constitution empowers only the President to "receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers," the courts have deferred to the executive branch when
determining which entities shall be considered foreign states. The recognition of foreign
states and of foreign governments, therefore, is wholly a prerogative of the executive
branch. Thus, it is outside the competence of the judiciary to pass judgment on
executive branch decisions regarding recognition. Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr.
v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
15. Marchetti, supra note I1, at 253.
alienage jurisdiction, but in doing so it used terminology similar to that
used in the Constitution without explaining how the courts should treat
stateless corporations."
16
After World War I1, with the demise of Hitlerian imperialism and the
creation of the United Nations, the Western powers steadfastly refused to
universally accept self-determination as many of these powers maintained
overseas colonies. 17 As outlined in the U.N. Charter, one of the purposes of
the organization is to develop "friendly relations among nations based on
16. Id. U.S. courts have been tackling the issue of stateless corporations in relation to
the alienage jurisdiction statute for less than fifty years. Id. at 252. It has been pointed out
that the Framers and drafters of the alienage jurisdiction rule, unfamiliar with the problem of
statelessness, thought they had included all non-Americans with the Code's reach. Christine
Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and Alienage Jurisdiction in
light of Abu-Zeineh v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 11 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 206
(1996). See also Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954). The Murarka case
is significant, also, in that it indicated the path the United States would follow in the
recognition of future states. The court held that "[u]nless form rather than substance is to
govern," Id. at 552, foreign parties should not be denied access to the federal courts because
their country of origin had not yet achieved formal recognition from the American executive.
Marchetti, supra note 11, at 268. In essence, the United States adheres to the more flexible de
facto approach to state recognition, in contrast to the formalistic de jure system. The federal
government applies almost a totality-of-the-circumstances type test in determining the
appropriateness of recognition. In 1976, the U.S. State Department noted that:
[In the view of the United States, international law does not require a state to
recognize another entity as a state; it is a matter for the judgment of each state
whether an entity merits recognition as a state. In reaching this judgment, the
United States has traditionally looked to the establishment of certain facts. These
facts include effective control over a clearly defined territory and population; an
organized governmental administration of that territory and a capacity to act
effectively to conduct foreign relations and to fulfill international obligations.
The United States has also taken into account whether the entity in question has
attracted the recognition of the international community of states.
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (4th ed. 1997).
The liberalized approach of Murarka appeared to be upheld in the case of National
Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf. The court concluded:
Considering these factors [various diplomatic interactions] in the aggregate, and not in
isolation, as integral components of the United States overall relationship to Iran, the
above recited connections strongly suggest that the Executive Branch has evinced an
implicit willingness to permit the government of Iran to avail itself of a federal forum.
National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1988).
One author comments that in National Petrochemical, the Court stressed that:
The executive must have the power to deal with unrecognized governments
and therefore the absence of formal recognition did not necessarily result in a
foreign government being barred from access to US courts. However, where
the executive has issued a non-recognition certificate and makes known its
view that in the instant case the unrecognized party should not be permitted
access to the courts, the courts appear very willing to comply.
SHAW, supra note 16, at 379 (citing Republic of Panama v. Republic National Bank of
New York, 681 F. Supp. 1066 (1988) and Republic of Panama v. Citizens & Southern
International Bank, 682 F. Supp. 1144 (1988)).
17. WOODRUFF D. SMITH, EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES, 220-21 (1982).
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respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples".' 8 The
U.N. Charter also states that "[m]embers of the United Nations which have or
assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have
not yet attained a full measure of self-govemment recognize the principle that the
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount". 19 Hence, during the
decades immediately following World War R1, the major colonial powers, due to
both domestic turmoil in the homeland from the effects of the war, as well as
international pressure, begrudgingly relinquished power and granted independence
to a multitude of states in Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Caribbean.2°
However, despite the greater mandate for self-determination and
decolonization following the Allied victory in 1945, the traditional regime of
state-centered balance of power, while perhaps waning, persists. To this, the
executive branch has yet to recognize a dependent territory as a state. 2' The
strategic, commercial, and diplomatic implications are obvious. Such action
would "undoubtedly upset those sovereigns possessed of these territories", as well
as contravene widely subscribed rules of international and U.S. common law.22
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
19. Id. art. 73, para. 1.
20. SMITH, supra note 17, at 239-46.
21. Baker, supra note 6, at 147.
22. Id. Current U.S. condemnation of the maintaining of dependent territories by
other nations would also appear quite hypocritical, as the United States maintains its own
overseas territories. As of August 2002, the U.S. Department of State has declared the
following as dependencies or areas of special sovereignty.
Australia: Ashmore & Cartier Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling)
Islands, Coral Sea Islands, Heard Island & McDonald Islands,
Norfolk Island
China: Hong Kong, Macau
Denmark: Faroe Islands, Greenland
France: Clipperton Island, French Polynesia, French Southern & Antarctic
Lands, Mayotte, New Caledonia, Saint Pierre & Miquelon, Wallis
& Futuna
Netherlands: Aruba, Netherlands Antilles
New Zealand: Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau
Norway: Bouvet Island, Jan Mayen, Svalbard
United Kingdom: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey,
Jersey, Isle of Man, Montserrat, Pitcairn Island, Saint Helena, South
Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands, Turks & Caicos Islands
United States: American Samoa, Baker Island, Guam, Howland Island, Jarvis
Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands, Navassa
Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Puerto Rico, U.S.
Virgin Islands, Wake Island
U.S. Department of State, Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/l0543.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
IV. PART III: WILSON, MATIMAK, SOUTHERN CROSS, AND
THE CONFLICT OF THE CIRCUITS
As pointed out by Justice Souter in the Traffic Stream decision, there
was a conflict between the federal circuits regarding the legal status of
overseas dependencies under 28 U.S.C. §, 1332(a)(2).23  Due to this
conflict, which "implicates serious issues of foreign relations", the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.24 The Court cites the cases of Wilson
v. Humphreys' (Cayman) Ltd. ,25 Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily,26 and
Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group
Ltd.,27 as evidence of the unconformity in the federal circuits. 28  This
section of the Article will discuss these cases, leading into analysis of
the June ruling in Traffic Stream.
A. Wilson v. Humphreys' (Cayman) Ltd.
In 1984, Wilson and her husband left Indianapolis bound for vacation in the
Cayman Islands. While lodging at Humphreys' hotel in the Caymans, Wilson
was assaulted, as an intruder attempted to rob and rape her.29 Wilson, who
suffered serious injuries requiting hospitalization, sued Humphreys' under the
alienage jurisdiction statute for negligence, breach of express and implied
warranties, breach of contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 30
Humphreys' moved to dismiss the claims on the bases of forum non
conveniens and lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction.3'
Humphreys' asserts that under the alienage statute, the U.S. federal court
may not exercise jurisdiction because the company is incorporated in the
Cayman Islands, territory not a "foreign state" . Because the "Cayman
23. Traffic Stream, supra note 2, at 2056-57.
24. Id.
25. Wilson v. Humphreys' (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990).
26. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1091 (2nd Cir. 1998).
27. Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group, 181
F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 1999).
28. Traffic Stream, supra note 2, at 2056-57. The Supreme Court also cites the Fourth
Circuit decision of Koehler v. Dodwell, which found alienage jurisdiction over a Bermuda
resident. Id. at 2057. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit does not go through an extensive
analysis to reach this conclusion. Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1998). See
also Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1139 n.6 (9th Cir.
2001), which observes that "[t]he Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have all held that[British Dependent Territories] are 'subjects of foreign states' for purposes of the diversity
statute .... Only the Second Circuit has taken the [opposite] view ......
29. Wilson v. Humphreys' (Cayman) Ltd., supra note 25, at 1241.
30. Id.
31. Id. For purposes of this paper, only the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) will be relevant.
32. Id. at 1242.
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Islands is a dependency of Great Britain and ... the United States does not
regard the Cayman Islands as an independent sovereign, 33 Humphreys'
argued that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit quickly dismissed
this argument. Although the Cayman Islands is a British Dependent
Territory, a citizen of such is a "citizen of the United Kingdom and
Colonies" under the British Nationality Act of 1981, Section 51(3)(a)(ii).34
Due to the obvious influence and control Great Britain has directly over
the Cayman Islands, to find for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
would be contrary to the spirit of the Murarka case, erroneously
permitting "form, rather than substance," to govern.35
B. Matimak Trading Company v. Khalily
This 1997 case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took
an approach quite different from that of Wilson, in essence becoming the
bane of those circuits by following a more flexible, liberal, and pragmatic
33. Id. The defendant relies on one obscure unpublished district court opinion
which concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking when one of the parties was
incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Id. at 1242-43 (citing St. Germain v. West Bay
Leasing Ltd., CV-81-3945, order (E.D.N.Y. 1982)). The Court counters with a district
court case of its own in regards to the status of Hong Kong. In Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd.
v. Shaheen, the court held that "it would seem hypertechnical to preclude Hong Kong
corporations from asserting claims in our courts simply because Hong Kong has not been
formally recognized by the United States as a foreign sovereign in its own right." Tetra
Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), cited in Wilson
v. Humphreys' (Cayman) Ltd., supra note 25, at 1243.
34. Wilson v. Humphreys' (Cayman) Ltd., supra note 25, at 1242 (quoting British
Nationality Act 1981, 31 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 172 (4th ed. 1987)).
According to an affidavit of a Cayman Islands attorney submitted by
Humphreys, the court system in the Cayman Islands is patterned after that of
Great Britain. In addition, "[t]he Common Law of England... is recognised
[sic] and applied by the Courts in all cases where there has not been a specific
local enactment." The Cayman Islands is administered by a governor who is
appointed by the British monarch. The United Kingdom represents Caymanian
diplomatic interests and is responsible for its military defense.
Id.
Under the various constitutions of the British Dependent Territories, each "confer[s] a
considerable degree of local responsibility and authority for dependent-territory affairs,
but under these constitutions and through the supreme Westminster authority, ultimate
control is reserved to the Crown." ELIZABETH W. DAVIES, THE LEGAL STATUS OF
BRITISH DEPENDENT TERRITORIES 136 (1995).
35. Wilson v. Humphreys' (Cayman) Ltd., supra note 25, at 1243 (quoting
Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., supra note 16, at 552).
approach. In affirming the decision of the federal district court,36 the Court
of Appeals held that Matimak, a Hong Kong corporation, was precluded
from claiming jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) in an action for
breach of contract.37 The Court acknowledged the liberal de facto analysis
of state recognition under the Murarka case,38 but tempered it with the Iran
Handicraft ruling stating that:
[T]he de facto test depends heavily on whether the Executive Branch regards
the entity as an "independent sovereign nation".... It is beyond cavil that
"[w]ho is the sovereign, de jure or defacto, of a territory is not ajudicial, but a
political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all
other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. '39
The Court felt inclined to follow a more conservative approach in line
with executive decision-making. To maintain harmony in U.S. foreign
policy, the Court asserted that there are "at least two compelling
reasons ... to continue to defer to the Executive Branch in defining a
'foreign state' for purposes of alienage jurisdiction: such deference is
consistent with (1) the purposes of alienage jurisdiction and (2) the well-
established analysis for defining a foreign state in related jurisdictional
statutes and constitutional provisions. 4 °
Under the first reason, the Court looked to both the political and
historical bases for alienage jurisdiction. The Court stressed that the
fundamental and original purpose of alienage jurisdiction was to avoid
controversy or entanglements between sovereign states and those peoples
and lands under their control. 4' Also, by providing relief to foreign
36. Matimak Trading Co. v Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
37. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 78.
38. Id. at 80.
39. Id. at 80 (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)).
40. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 82.
41. The Matimak court states that:
The raison d'etre of alienage jurisdiction is to avoid "entanglements with other
sovereigns that might ensue from failure to treat the legal controversies of
aliens on the national level." Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. At 1277; see Sadat
v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1186 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting the "paramount
purpose" of the alienage jurisdiction provision is to avoid offence to foreign
nations because of the possible appearance of injustice to their citizens); Van
Der Schelling v. U.S. News & World Report, 213 F. Supp. 756, 758-61 (E.D.
Pa) (noting the drafters' emphasis on preserving peace with foreign nations,
the inability of a prince or sovereign of a country to redress prejudice against
one of his citizens or subjects in our courts, and their conviction that such
prejudice amounts to aggression upon the sovereign), aff'd 324 F.2d 956 (3d
Cir. 1963); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (noting the "[a]pprehension of entanglements with other
sovereigns that might ensue from failure to treat the legal controversies of
aliens on a national level").
Id. at 82-83.
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nationals under the federal judicial system, perceived state discrimination
against foreigners, prevalent at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War
and the early years of the nascent country, was to be assuaged.42
The Court asserted:
[Tihese rationales command deference to the Executive Branch's recognition of a
foreign entity. Where the Executive Branch determines that a foreign entity is not
a "sovereign", there is no threat of entanglement with a sovereign stemming from
the refusal of a federal court to treat that entity's citizen in a national forum. To be
sure, if an unrecognized foreign entity perceives that its citizens have been subject
to bias in a state court, there may be foreign-relations repercussions ....
[Nevertheless] [i]t is the bailiwick of the Executive Branch, however, to evaluate
the autonomy and resources of a foreign entity in evaluating whether the entity
constitutes a sovereign and independent state; it is for the Executive Branch, not
the courts, to anticipate where potential "entanglements" with such entities are
appreciable enough to recognize sovereign status.
" 3
The Court next argues, somewhat superfluously and anticlimactically, that
various federal statutes, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1332(a)(2),
1332(a)(4), and 1441(d), provide further guidance in determining the
definition of a foreign state.4 Curiously, the Court never quite reaches a
42. The Court went on to comment, "[s]everal states had failed to give foreigners
proper protection under the treaties concluded with England at the end of the
Revolution." ... Local animosity was so great that only national tribunals could compel
the enforcement of a national treaty." Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 n.6 (1927-28). The drafters' concern with the
failure of individual states to protect foreigners under treaties is intertwined with their
intent to "provide the federal courts with a form of protective jurisdiction over matters
implicating international relations where the national interest was paramount." Sadat v.
Mertes, 615 F.2d at 1182, quoted in Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 83.
43. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 83.
44. Id. at 83-84.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to the amount
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect
to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections
1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between ... (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state; or, . . . (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title,
as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2), (4) (1994 & Supp. 2002).
"Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending .. " 28
U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994). "A [foreign state] ... includes a political subdivision of foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state ..." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994).
conclusion on the meaning of the term. Ultimately, the Court concedes that
Congress, while using the term repeatedly, never defines it.45 Apparently
straining, the majority fails to provide any further guidance and falls back on
its bedrock executive branch deference argument. 6 Therefore, to resolve
whether Hong Kong is a state for alienage jurisdiction purposes, the Court
looks to various diplomatic instruments.47 One must recall that in June 1997,
Hong Kong was in a period of complex transition, from British to Chinese
control. When Matimak brought suit in August 1995, Hong Kong was a
British Dependent Territory.48 "As such, it maintained some independence in
its international economic and diplomatic relationships, but in matters of
defense and foreign affairs remained dependent on the United Kingdom.
49
Due to the British control of Hong Kong present at the filing of the suit, as
well as a State Department request to withdrawal consideration of treatment
of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state, "it is clear that the United States
did not recognize Hong Kong as a sovereign and independent international
entity .... Accordingly, consistent with this Court's precedent, Matimak
cannot invoke alienage jurisdiction as a 'citizen or subject' of Hong Kong.",50
45. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 83.
46. Id. at 84. ("The courts must respect the role of the Executive Branch in foreign
affairs, both by acknowledging its evaluation of a foreign entity's sovereignty, and thus
international standing, and by respecting its determination as to whether a foreign entity
or its government should be permitted to sue in our courts." Id.). See also Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983). ("Actions against foreign
sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the
United States, and the primacy of federal concerns is evident." Id.).
47. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 81-82.
48. Id. at 81. See also Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957) (noting that
diversity attaches at the time a complaint is filed).
49, Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 81.
50. Id. at 82. The Court looks to the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992
and letters from the Departments of Justice and State.
Hong Kong's relationship with the United States was most recently manifested in
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, [22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732],
which makes clear that Congress desires United States-Hong Kong relations to
continue after July 1, 1997, when Hong Kong becomes a special administrative
region of China .... The Policy Act makes ... clear... that the United States does
not regard Hong Kong as an independent, sovereign political entity .... The
United States has embraced the same position on this appeal. Having originally
stated that "Hong Kong should ... be treated in the courts of the United States as a
defacto 'foreign state' for purposes of alienage jurisdiction"... the United States
reversed course. In its amicus brief, the Justice Department notes that "[t]he State
Department no longer urges treatment of Hong Kong as a defacto foreign state and
withdraws any reliance on this contention."
Id.
For an interesting contrast see Favour Mind Ltd. v. Pacific Shores, Inc, No. 98 Civ.
7038(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999), available at 1999 Wl 115217. This case involves
the district court's interpretation of the Matimak analysis in post-reversion Hong Kong.
In October 1998, the plaintiff, a Hong Kong corporation filed a complaint alleging
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Id. at *2. In denying defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court held the Hong Kong,
[VOL. 4: 319, 2003] The Stateless Corporation
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
To further bolster its contention that Matimak cannot avail itself to the
alienage jurisdiction statute, the Court looked to whether the Hong Kong
corporation could consider itself a "citizen or subject" of the United
Kingdom.51 In reaching its decision, the Court recited the "truism that a
foreign state is entitled to define who are its citizens or subjects. 52
Furthermore, it is another precept of international law that "a corporation,
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is a 'citizen' or 'subject' of the entity
under whose sovereignty it is created., 53 In the case of Hong Kong, the
British Nationality Acts of 1948 and 1981 state that the "privileges of
British nationality are not conferred on corporations formed under the laws
of Hong Kong."'54 The Court concludes that, in spite of assertions from the
Department of Justice that "ultimate sovereign authority over the plaintiff is
the British Crown", Matimak, organized under the law of Hong Kong, is
neither a "citizen" nor a "subject" of the United Kingdom.55
The Court did not appear fazed by it rendering Matimak almost impotent.
In essence, the Court relegates Matimak to a jurisprudential purgatory.
Matimak is a corporation organized under the laws of Hong Kong, clearly an
international entity of some sort. But under the Court's decision, "Matimak is
while clearly still not a state, was a citizen of China. The Court states: "The overriding
lesson of Matimak is that courts must defer to the executive branch of the United States
government and the policies of foreign governments when evaluating the status of alien
territories and alien parties for purposes of § 1332(a)(2)." Id. at *3. Post-reversion
Hong Kong is no way deemed a foreign state by the United States. Id. at *6. However,
the Favour Mind court holds that the plaintiff is a citizen or subject of China, satisfying
the alienage jurisdiction statute. The court notes a letter from the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the State Department, which states:
Hong Kong is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China. The Hong
Kong SAR is a local administrative region of the People's Republic of China which
shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Companies established in the Hong Kong SAR
in accordance with its laws and decrees therefore enjoy the nationality of the [PRC].
Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, the court notes that both "the United States and Hong Kong explicitly state in
their amicus submissions that they too consider Hong Kong SAR corporations to be Chinese
citizens." Id. at *7 n.12. Therefore, the court clearly finds that Hong Kong corporations are
citizens of China for purposes of alienage jurisdiction. "A judicial finding that Hong Kong
corporations are not citizens of China would engender precisely the harm to our foreign relations
that the founders intended to forestall through the creation of alienage jurisdiction." Id. at *9.
51. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 85.
52. Id. (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898)).
53. Id. A "corporation of a foreign State is, for purposes of jurisdiction in the
courts of the United States, to be deemed constructively, a citizen or subject of such
State." Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882).
54. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 85.
55. Id. at 86.
not a 'citizen or subject' of a foreign state. It is thus stateless. And a stateless
person-the proverbial man without a country-cannot sue a United States
citizen under alienage jurisdiction. This would seem contrary to the
historical bases of alienage jurisdiction and arguments against hypertechnical
analysis regarding dependent territories discussed above.57 As will be discussed
in the next case, an obvious split between the circuits was about to occur.
C. Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong
Shipping Group Ltd.
In June 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit signaled a
significant rift between the circuits in determining the status of overseas
dependencies for purpose of alienage jurisdiction.58 The Court held that
56. Id. Of course, "stateless persons are not totally denied an American forum; they
may choose to sue in a state court." Id. at 88. According to Matimak, corporations from
dependent territories have no choice but to turn to state courts. Baker, supra note 6, at 135.
Interestingly, citizens of Taiwan have been allowed to sue under alienage jurisdiction
rules, despite formal de-recognition by the U.S. government. See Chang v. Northwestern
Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. I11. 1980), cited in Southern Cross Overseas
Agencies Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group, Ltd., supra note 27, at 418 n.5. In Trop
v. Dulles, the Supreme Court asserted that statelessness is "a condition deplored in the
international community of democracies." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958).
57. One should look to the Matimak dissent for further evidence of the majority's
wayward rationale. Judge Altimari is clearly concerned with the negative ramifications
of this decision. For example, he states:
[T]he majority's holding is a death knell for Hong Kong corporations seeking
access to our federal courts under alienage jurisdiction . . . . The idea of
statelessness was not in the contemplation of the Framers and it is likely that
the Framers envisioned "citizens or subjects of foreign states" to be anyone
who is not a United States citizen .... A stateless corporation is an oxymoron.
In the United States, a corporation cannot be created without the imprimatur of
the state. This is also true in Great Britain and Hong Kong ... Is it thus so
easy to disavow a person or a corporate entity?
Id. at 88-89. As one author points out:
Unfortunately, the Matimak court failed to strike an appropriate balance between a
respect for historical constitutional meanings and a healthy willingness to
reconsider those understandings in light of world changes. The Matimak court
should have been more willing to adapt prior judicial interpretations of alienagejurisdiction to the evolution of the international system since the time of the
Constitution's drafting. Its hesitancy to do so rendered the holding of the case
questionable and the logic upon which the holding rested obsolete. Thus, the case
of Matimak is a broad cautionary tale of the dangers that arise when courts fail to
respect not only original intentions, but contemporary reality.
Jonathan Shafter, Original Intentions and International Reality: States, Sovereignty, and
the Misinterpretation of Alienage Jurisdiction in Matimak v. Khalily, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 729, 732-33 (2001).
58. The Southern Cross Court stated: "The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has determined that Hong Kong corporations, being neither 'citizens' nor 'subjects' of a
foreign state, were 'stateless' and therefore do not fall within federal alienage diversity
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) .... We disagree." Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc.
v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., supra note 27, at 413. The facts of this case should
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Hong Kong's status prior to the change of control from the United
Kingdom to China in 1997 (as was the case in Matimak as well) brought
Hong Kong within the purview of the alienage jurisdiction statute.5 9 The
Court closely follows the Matimak analysis, eventually diverging to base
its ruling on Constitutional history and the term "subject". Regarding the
first, the Court states:
Historical evidence from the Federalist Papers and the debates over the
ratification of the Constitution shows that the Framers often "refer[red] to citizens,
subjects, and foreigners interchangeably." [Van Der Schelling, 213 F. Supp. at
759]. In fact, the phrase "citizens or subjects" reflected an expansive intent:
The framers of the Constitution were undoubtedly keenly aware of the fact
that they had lately been subjects and that in other lands men still remained
subjects of a sovereign and not citizens of a state .... It was only by the
inclusion of "subjects" that all aliens, whether they [owed] allegiance to a
sovereign monarch or were citizens of a democracy, could sue or be sued in
federal courts .... [In addition, the query was posited:] [W]ho are to be
deemed aliens entitled to sue in the courts of the United States? The
general answer is, any person who is not a citizen of the United States.60
In regards to the second ground, the Court found that while a Hong Kong
corporation is not a "citizen" of the United Kingdom, it may be deemed a
"subject' . Acknowledging that, traditionally, the terms "citizen" and
"subject" are analogous, it does not follow that "a sovereign must have only
'citizens' or only 'subjects' .62 Rather, the Court assert that "British law...
seems to recognize both 'citizens' and 'subjects'. 63 Looking to the British
Nationality Act of 1948, the Court conceded that corporations are excluded
under this law.64 However, in exercising deference to the executive branch,
be of little concern for the reader. In fact, as the opinion states: "This suit for sums past due
for transportation of cargo emerges from a setting of contractual relationships and prior
litigation so complicated and convoluted as to almost boggle the mind. It will take over
thirteen pages of typescript to describe them." Id. at 412.
59. Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd.,
supra note 27, at 418-19.
60. Id. at 416 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at418.
62. Id. at 417. "The term 'citizen,' as understood in our law, is precisely
analogous to the term 'subject' in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely
resulted from the change of government." United States v. Ark, 169 U.S. at 663-64,
quoted in Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd.,
supra note 27, at 417. "A monarchy has subjects; a republic has citizens." JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., I MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.75 (3d ed. 1996), quoted in Southern
Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., supra note 27, 417.
63. Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd.,
supra note 27, at 417.
64. Id. at 418.
the Court finds that "the State Department's position is that Hong Kong's
law required Crown approval at the relevant time, and its conclusion that
Hong Kong corporations were thus ultimately subject to United Kingdom
sovereignty seems eminently reasonable . . . . [To this] [w]e accord
substantial weight to the State Department's position. 65
In its conclusion, the Third Circuit appears to adopt an objective
balancing approach to determine the availability of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)
to dependent territories. The Court wants to place more significance on
the actual relationship between the dependent territory and the mother
country assisted through the use of diplomatic resources, such as the State
Department. The Court admits that Hong Kong corporations are not
citizens of the United Kingdom.66 However,
The State Department ... has informed [the Court] that, consistent with various
agreements with Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, it considers Hong Kong
corporations to have been subjects of the United Kingdom for alienage diversity
purposes. This, it represents, best reflects the actual relationship between the
United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and the United States .... [W]e agree with the
State Department that treating Hong Kong corporations as United Kingdom
subjects comports with the facts and the law of alienage jurisdiction.67
With Southern Cross, like Matimak, considerations from the Executive
Branch are to be "accord[ed] substantial weight." 68 In both cases, deference
is bestowed upon the State Department and its determination of the status of
Hong Kong. The critical split is between the Second and Third Circuits'
interpretations of the "citizens or subjects" phrase of the alienage
jurisdiction statute. In Matimak, the Department of Justice concluded that,
while Hong Kong corporations are not citizens of the United Kingdom, they
"should be treated as... subject[s] ... for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. "69




68. Id.; Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 83.
69. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 86. This dismissal of the
Justice Department's conclusion seems at odds with Matimak's overall deference to the
Executive Branch. Perhaps there were some professional tension between the Court and
Justice over the Department's amicus brief. The Court mentions that in its brief, the
Justice Department comments that the "State Department no longer urges treatment of
Hong Kong as a defacto foreign state and withdraws any reliance of this contention."
Id. at 82. Ironically, the Court, in a footnote, states:
The Justice Department chose to inform the court of this crucial fact in a footnote.
This Court frowns on raising such important points in footnotes, either before the
district court or on appeal. "The enormous volume of briefs and arguments pressed
on each panel of this court at every sitting precludes our scouring through footnotes
in search of some possibly meritorious point that counsel did not consider of
sufficient importance to include as part of the argument."
Id. at n.2 (quoting United States v. Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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'subjects' than 'citizens'. ' '7° In contrast, Southern 'Cross had little difficulty
in accepting the notion that a sovereign nation may possess both "citizens"
and "subjects". 71  Allowing this division to occur within the bounds of
federal and international law was deemed "eminently reasonable".72
By June of that year, the Second Circuit continued to be the vanguard of
the federal judiciary in the charge to deny alienage jurisdiction protection to
dependent territories by balancing the laws of the mother country with
directives from the Executive Branch. With the advent of the Traffic Stream
decision, the Supreme Court has promulgated a simple rule, more akin to
Wilson than the more complex analyses of Matimak and Southern Cross.73
V. PART IV: TRAFFIC STREAM AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
A. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the SecondS•74
Circuit, which had held that a British Virgin Islands (BVI) corporation
could not be subject to alienage jurisdiction.75 Obviously bound to the
70. Id. at 82.
71. Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd.,
supra note 27, at 417.
72. Id. at 418.
73. In Matimak, the majority acknowledges several district court cases that found
that Hong Kong was a "foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). However, the Court
summarily dismisses them.
We are not unaware that several district courts have concluded that Hong Kong
is a "foreign state" for purposes of alienage jurisdiction. The district courts
that have done this have done so cursorily and with out benefit of briefing from
the parties .... without any analysis .... or without considering the stance of
the Executive Branch .... These cases are uniformly unpersuasive .... [See
Timco Eng'g, Inc. v. Rex & Co., 603 F. Supp 925, 930 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Refco, Inc. v. Troika Inv. Ltd., 702 F. Supp. 684, 685 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Creative Distribs., Ltd. v. Sari Niketan, Inc. No. 89 C 3614 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
available at 1989 WL 105210, at *2.]
Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 84. See also Neth. Shipmortgage Corp. v.
Madias, 717 F.2d. 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that a Bermuda corporation comes under
alienage jurisdiction). Not surprisingly, the Matimak court finds the Netherlands decision
"unenlightening". Id. at 85. The Court also cites Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd.,
which held that Hong Kong was not a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Windert
Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Using a letter
from the State Department confirming that the United States does not recognize Hong Kong
as a foreign state, the Matimak court states that Windert "conscientiously applied the standards
outlined in Murarka." Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 84-85.
74. Traffic Stream, supra note 2, at 2057.
75. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 251 F.3d
334, 337 (2nd Cir. 2001).
Matimak analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that the British Virgin Islands
is a British Overseas Territory,76 not a foreign state. As such, and absent an
Executive request otherwise, the Court dismissed the complaint.77  The
Supreme Court overruled this decision. In reversing the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court, in essence, overturned Matimak78 and set forth a streamlined
analysis for the relationship between alienage jurisdiction and corporations in
dependent territories. The decision of Justice Souter hinges on the degree of
control of the mother sovereign over the dependent territory. The Court states:
[We have never held that the requisite status as citizen or subject must be held
directly from a formally recognized state, as distinct from such a state's legal
dependency. On the contrary, a consideration of the relationships of the BVI and the
recognized state of the United Kingdom convinces us that any such distinction
would be entirely beside the point of the statute providing alienage jurisdiction. 79
To support this, the Court looked to the constitution of the BVI and
observed that the United Kingdom exercises considerable authority over
the islands. For example, the BVI Constitution provides that,
[The] BVI Government shall include a Governor and Deputy Governor appointed
by the Queen to 'hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure',.., an Executive
Council mainly appointed by the Governor on the basis of the popular election for
the Legislative Council, ... and a Legislature comprising the Queen and a
Legislative Council of mainly popularly elected representatives. 0 [Furthermore,]
[t]he Governor is instructed to withhold assent from any bill that may conflict with
the laws of the United Kingdom.... [t]he Queen, acting through a Secretary of
State, has authority to annul any BVI statute, ... [and if] the Legislative Council fails
to pass.., a Bill or motion.., the Governor may, at any time that he thinks fit,....
declare that such Bill or motion shall have effect as if it had been passed. 81
In spite of this, the Supreme Court, apparently dissatisfied with Matimak
notes that "t]he Second Circuit nonetheless takes the position that the
relationship between the United Kingdom and its territories is 'too attenuated' ,2
The Supreme Court next looks to the constitutional history of alienage
jurisdiction, which has been discussed earlier in this Article. Basically,
fundamental concerns over fairness to foreigners in American courts,
stability in international relations, and encouragement of foreign investment
76. Id. The Second Circuit points out that in February 1998, the United Kingdom
declared all "Dependent Territories" are to be called "Overseas Territories". Id. at n. I.
The change was merely nominal. Id.
77. The plaintiff, Chase, sued Traffic Stream, under New York law, for breach of
contract, replevin of collateral, specific enforcement of defendant's reporting obligations,
an accounting, and recovery of costs for collection. Id. at 335.
78. See Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 2002 WL 1766444, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
July 31, 2002).
79. Traffic Stream, supra note 2, at 2057.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2058. To sum up, "[t]he Crown's representatives have not slept on their
powers, . . and it seems fair to regard a BVI company as a citizen or subject of this
ultimate political authority." Id. at 2058.
82. Id. at 2058 (quoting Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, supra note 26, at 86).
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were "principal reason[s] for having the alienage and diversity jurisdictions,
and that [these were some] of the most important reasons for a federal
judiciary. 83  The Court went on to stress that the current relationship
between the British Crown and the BVI places the United Kingdom "well
within the range of concern addressed" by the alienage jurisdiction
provision.84 British sovereignty over the BVI, including protection of her
corporations, "point[s] to just the kind of relationship that the Framers
believed would bind sovereigns... 'to redress the wrong[s]' against their
nationals"85 and bring them under the purview of alienage jurisdiction.
Finally, the Supreme Court tackled the defendant's arguments concerning the
semantic debate over the "citizens or subjects" clause of the statute. The
defendant asserted that it is neither a citizen nor subject, but rather a national of
the United Kingdom under the Crown's British Nationality Act.86  This
argument is dismissed by the Court by stating that its primary weakness is "its
failure to recognize that jurisdictional analysis under the law of the United States
is not ultimately governed by the law of the United Kingdom, whatever that may
be.''87 The Court's "jurisdictional concern here is with the meaning of 'citizen'
and 'subject' as those terms are used in § 1332(a)(2). In fact, we have no need to
even decide whether [the defendant's] reading of the British Nationality Act is
wrong... ,,88 Therefore, the Court appears to find British demarcations of citizen,
subject, and national irrelevant. Whether nationals enjoy fewer or more rights
than a citizen or subject is of no concern. 89 What was of concern to the Court is
the purpose of the alienage statute and whether the BVI corporation falls within
the scope of "citizen" or "subject" under U.S. law only. The Court concludes:
Given the object of the alienage statute... there is no serious question that "nationals"
were meant to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, leaving it immaterial
for our purposes that the law of the United Kingdom may provide different rights of
abode for individuals in the territories .... It is enough to hold that the United Kingdom's
retention and exercise of authority over the BVI renders BVI citizens, whether natural or
juridic, "citizens or subjects" of the United Kingdom under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).90
83. Id. at 2059 (quoting Wythe Holt, To Establish Justice. Politics, the Judiciary Act
of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1473 (1989)).
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITTION 493 (J. Elliot ed., 1876)).
86. Id. at 2060.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2061.
89. "For good or ill, many societies afford greater rights to some of its members




With Traffic Stream, the Supreme Court created an elegant symbiosis of
original historical legislative intent while promoting uniformity and a
sense of stability under the demands of the modem international economic
system dominated by multinational corporations. The Matimak. analysis
denied alienage jurisdiction over corporations from dependent territories.
This could have resulted in multiple evils. Such corporations would be
precluded from suing in U.S. federal courts, risking disruption of
international trade, straining commercial relationships, creating mistrust of
the American judicial system, and promoting statelessness. In the
converse, wronged American citizens or companies would not be able to
avail themselves to their own nation's federal courts, perhaps inducing a
proliferation of deceptive or phantom corporations knowingly immune
from federal jurisdiction. The Court's unanimity confirms that the
judiciary should be dedicated to the original intent of alienage jurisdiction
and not engage in a battle of semantics. The Founding Fathers were
undoubtedly educated in the Westphalian state system and the teachings of
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and other classical realists. At our nation's creation,
the state, with its hunger for hegemony, was the supreme international
actor. To believe the early leaders of the United States perceived of
territorial entities beyond the nation-state and its colonies seems almost
implausible. In Traffic Stream, Justice Antonin Scalia, the textualist
master, steps aside without a murmur, without a call for a strict
interpretation of the "foreign state" language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
In conclusion, the Traffic Stream ruling heeded the call for clarification
and uniformity within the federal circuits and negated the relevance of
how a foreign sovereign perceives its citizens or subjects under its own
laws. Authority by the sovereign over the dependent territory appears to
be the fundamental issue to be considered. As the United States becomes
further committed to entrenchment in the global economic system,
increasing access to, as well as reliance on, the federal courts will enhance
the desire of engaging in commercial activities by corporations, both
domestic and abroad.
